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EVIDENCE-CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE-Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (Mar. 30, 1973).
The United States Constitution vests the judicial power of the Uni-
ted States in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress
may create.' The Constitution is silent, however, as to which body-
Congress or the judiciary-has the power to prescribe rules of prac-
tice and procedure for the federal courts. The United States Supreme
Court concluded in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 2 that Congress has the
power to regulate practice and procedure in the federal courts but has
lawfully delegated this function to the Supreme Court under the rules
enabling acts.3 Because these acts limit the Court's authority to mat-
ters of procedure, recent discussion of proposed rules of evidence for
federal courts has caused serious doubts to be expressed whether such
rules would be authorized by the phrase "practice and procedure."
In March 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States, 4 an
advisory body to the Supreme Court, approved the proposal of its
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to establish
an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, and in 1962 a Special
Committee of the Judicial Conference tentatively concluded that: "[ 1 ]
Rules of evidence applied in the federal courts should be improved;
and [2] Rules of evidence, which would be uniform throughout the
Federal Court system, are both advisable and feasible. ' 5 The Special
Committee invited the bench and bar to comment on the proposal
that federal rules of evidence be promulgated, and in response to en-
thusiastic comments the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court appointed
I. U.S. CONST. art Ill, § 1. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
2. 312 U.S. I (1941). See notes 25-29 and accompanying text infra.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402 (magistrates and appeals to district courts). 3771 (criminal
cases in district courts) (1970); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 (district courts). 2075 (bank-
ruptcy proceedings) (1970).
4. The Judicial Conference is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970) to carry
on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the rules of practice and proce-
dure prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
5. Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts. 30 F.R.D. 73. 77. 114
(1962). Currently. the admissibility of evidence in federal courts is governed by FED. R.
Civ. P. 43(a) and FED. R. CRINI. P. 26. In civil cases, evidence is to be admitted if it is
admissible under a statute of the United States, a rule of evidence heretofore applied in
federal courts of equity, or a rule of evidence applied in the courts of the state in which
the United States court is sitting. In criminal cases, the admissibility of evidence is gov-
erned "by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience.- Id.
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the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and a Reporter for the
Committee.6
The Advisory Committee held fourteen sessions between June 18,
1965, and December 14, 1968, to work out a preliminary draft of the
rules.7 The preliminary draft was circulated to the legal profession in
pamphlet form with a request that all comients be submitted not
later than April 1, 1970. The draft was then revised, recirculated,8
revised again,9 approved by the Judicial Conference in October,
1971, and forwarded to the Court with the recommendation that the
rules be promulgated.10 This draft was approved by the Court, Justice
Douglas dissenting, on November 20, 1972.11
Although the Civil Rules Enabling Act' 2 provides that rules pro-
mulgated by the Supreme Court take effect automatically 90 days af-
ter they have been reported to Congress, the Court's order provided
that the rules were not to go into effect until July 1, 1973.' 3
However, on January 29, 1973, a bill to secure to the Congress
additional time to consider the rules of evidence was introduced in the
Senate.14 Thereafter, hearings on the proposed rules were held for six
6. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 177-78 (1969).
7. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Re-
form of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 75 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
8. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
9. A comparison of a memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Richard Klein-
dienst to Chief Justice Burger, Hearings, note 7 supra, at 42-59, with an analysis of the
differences between the March 1971 draft and the final draft, id. at 121-29, indicates
that most, if not all, of the changes involve incorporation of the recommendations of the
Justice Department.
10. Hearings, note 7 supra, at 75-76.
11. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183(1973). Justice Douglas expressed a "two-fold concern" over the Rules of Evidence. He
questioned whether the rules are within the purview of the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (1970), and whether the justices are qualified to appraise the merits of a code of
evidence. 56 F.R.D. at 185-86.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
13. 56 F.R.D. 184(1973).
14. S. 583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Senator Ervin's bill provided that the pro-
posed rules "shall have no force or effect prior to the adjournment sine die of the first
session of the Ninety-third Congress except to the extent that they may be expressly ap-
proved by such Congress prior to such sine die adjournment." Id. at § 1.
On the same day that the Senate approved Senator Ervin's proposal, "a bill to provide
adequate time for the Congress to consider the rules of evidence" (H.R. 4051, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)) and "a bill to amend the laws enabling the Court to promulgate
rules of procedure to require the approval of Congress" (H.R. 4052, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1973)) were introduced in the House and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
119 CONG. REC. 22, H873 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1973).
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days before the House Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws. The hearings revealed that: 15
[T] here were constitutional difficulties with some of the proposed
rules insofar as they purported, in certain civil cases, to supplant State
laws in the area of privilege; that, because of the arguably substantive
nature of some of the proposed rules, there was also a serious question
whether the rules were within the authority granted ... in the enabling
acts to promulgate rules of "practice and procedure"; that the method
of promulgation of [the] rules by the Advisory and Standing Commit-
tees of the Judicial Conference may have been deficient in not af-
fording all interested persons and organizations an opportunity for
comment; and that the content and wisdom of a number of specific
rules [were] open to extensive debate.
In light of the information gathered at the hearings, there was some
concern expressed over whether the Senate proposal, which merely
delayed the effective date of the rules, was adequate to insure ample
time for consideration of the rules. Thus, in order to provide the nec-
essary time and to assert what it saw to be the primacy of Congress in
the promulgation of such rules, an overwhelming majority of the
House approved an amendment to the Senate bill, providing that the
proposed rules should have no effect unless expressly approved by
Congress. 16
Legislation to adopt the rules as prescribed by the Court was intro-
duced so that the efforts of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evi-
dence might not be wasted and so that Congress might work its will
15. 119 CONG. REC. 40, H1723 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1972). In response to a request
by the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Charles Halpern
and George Frampton, Jr. of the Washington Council of Lawyers prepared a memo-
randum which classified each proposed rule as controversial or noncontroversial; ap-
proximately one-half of the rules were classified as controversial. Hearings, note 7 su-
pra, at 190.
When the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole to discuss Senator
Ervin's bill, Representative H. R. Gross (Iowa) expressed special concern over the effect
of the rules upon the husband-wife privilege. Mr. Gross, a nonlawyer, proclaimed that
he has been married to the same woman for 44 years and asked whether any changes in
the privilege might be the result of "the new women's liberation movement." Represent-
ative Gross, who had not yet read the rules, expressed his hope that the evidence code
would be considered under an open rule (i.e., amendments allowed from the floor) so
that he might be able to offer an amendment to the husband-wife privilege. Representa-
tive Gross has also expressed concern that nonlawyers will "take a back seat" to the
lawyers if the code is considered under an open rule. 119 CONG. REC. 40, H 1722-24
(daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973).
16. 119 CONG. REC. 40, H1723, H1730-31 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973). The Senate
accepted the amendment, 119 CONG. REC. 42, S5009 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1973), and the
1186
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on the proposed rules. 17 Using the rules proposed by the Court as a
working model,' 8 the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House
Judiciary Committee produced a set of rules which passed the House
on February 6, 1974.19
This history is indicative of the conflict between the Court and
Congress over the Court's authority to promulgate rules of evidence.
Central to this controversy is the question of whether rules of evidence
are substantive or procedural. This note is devoted to a discussion of
that issue, ultimately arriving at the conclusion that most of the rules
which were prescribed by the Court are procedural in nature and,
therefore, within the Court's power to prescribe rules of practice and
procedure under the enabling acts.
I. THE SOURCES OF THE COURT'S POWER TO
PRESCRIBE RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Constitution of the United States provides: "The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."' 20 Since the Constitution vests the judicial power in the
courts, commentators have argued that only the judicial branch has
Act, in its final form, was thereafter signed into law. Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (Mar.
30, 1973) provides:
An Act to promote the separation of constitutional powers by suspending the effec-
tiveness of the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, the
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure transmitted to the Congress by the Chief Jus-
tice on February 5, 1973, until approved by Act of Congress.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that notwithstanding any other provisions of law,
the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, the Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which are embraced by the orders entered by the Supreme
Court of the United States on Monday, November 20, 1972, shall have no force or
effect except to the extent, and with such amendments, as they may be expressly
approved by Act of Congress.
17. 119 CONG. REC. 38, H1638 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1973).
18. Rules of Evidence Proposed by Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Judiciary Committee, 42 U.S.L.W. (Special Supp. July 17, 1973) (among the major
changes proposed by the Subcommittee are the deletion of R. 303, Presumptions in
Criminal Cases, all of Article V, Privileges, and R. 803 (24), a broad exception to the
hearsay rule). The Subcommittee's draft is reproduced in 119 CONG. REC. 100,
H5452-61 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1973).
19. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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the power to prescribe rules for the dispatch of the judiciary's duties.2 t
On the other hand, it can be argued that since Congress has the power
to establish inferior courts, it necessarily possesses the power to pre-
scribe the rules of practice and procedure for such courts. 22 In fact, if
Congress possesses the power to prescribe rules of practice and proce-
dure for the inferior courts, the enabling acts23 might seem to consti-
tute an unlawful delegation of such power.2 4
The issue has been decisively resolved, however, in Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., wherein the Court concluded that:25
Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure
of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this
[the Supreme Court of the United States] or other federal courts au-
2 1. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitu-
tionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928) (emphasis in original):
[fT lie legislature (federal or state) exceeds its constitutional power when it at-
tempts to impose upon the judiciary any rules for the dispatch of the judiciary's du-
ties; and that therefore all legislatively declared rules for procedure, civil or crimi-
nal, in the courts, are void, except such as are expressly stated in the Constitution.
There is some authority for the proposition that the Court has the inherent power to pre-
scribe rules. In 1792, in response to a request by the Attorney General for information
relative to the system of practice by which the attorneys and counsellors before the Su-
preme Court should regulate themselves, the Court stated that the practice of the King's
Bench and Chancery in England provided models for the practice of the Court. in which
it would, from time to time, make such "alterations" as circumstances might render
necessary. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 414 (1792) (the Court's reply to the Attorney General was
entitled a "Rule"). Since the King's Bench promulgated rules of court, the Supreme
Court, having taken the King's Bench as a model, might be supposed to possess the in-
herent power to prescribe such rules. See I W.TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S
BENCH AND CONVIrON PLEAS xxxv-xlix (3d Am. from 9th London ed. 1840) (fifteen
pages ofGeneral Rules, Orders and Notices, the oldest of which is dated 1604): E. JENKS.
A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 191-92 (5th ed. 1938). If the Court does have the
inherent power to prescribe rules of court, then the enabling acts do no more than re-
state such power. Jenks states that in England:
Parliament began to look with more and more jealousy on any rival in the business
of legislation: and, as it was clearly advisable not to withdraw in fact from the
judges the necessary function of issuing Rules of Practice, Parliament, in the first
half of the nineteenth century began definitely, as in the case of the Crown, to au-
thorize judges to exercise it.
id.
22. Congress possesses the power under the Constitution to "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the powers vested in the
Congress, the Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer of the
Government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23. Generally, the enabling acts provide that the Court has the power to promulgate
rules of practice and procedure for the federal courts. See statutes cited at note 3 supra.
24. Walsh. Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 6 ORE. L. REV.
1 (1926).
25. 312 U.S. 1. 9-10 (1941), accord, Beers v. Haughton. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329. 359
(1835); Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 53. 60 (1825):
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
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thority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or the constitu-
tion of the United States.
In Sibbach the petitioner's contention was that Rules 35 and 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affect substantive rights, and there-
fore their promulgation was not within the Court's power under the
Enabling Act.2 6 In addressing the petitioner's contention, the Court
concluded that the Enabling Act 27 "was purposely restricted in its
operation to matters of pleading and court practice and procedure. '28
In so concluding, the Court relied upon the language in the Enabling
Act that the Court shall not "abridge, enlarge, nor modify substantive
rights." 29
Thus, the current state of the law is that Congress has the power to
regulate the practice and procedure of the federal courts, and that
Congress may delegate such power to the Supreme Court. The ena-
bling acts constitute such a delegation of power. However, the Court's
authority under the enabling acts is limited to rules, including rules of
evidence, which affect "practice and procedure" and does not extend
to substantive matters.
26. 312 U.S. at 3, 9. FED. R. Civ. P. 35 provides: "In an action in which the mental
or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is
pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician."
FED. R. Civ. P. 37 outlines the consequences of a refusal to comply with an order such
as might be made under Rule 35. The Court concluded in Sibbach that "the rules under
attack are within the authority granted [to the Court under the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1972)]." 312 U.S. at 16.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970):
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the dis-
trict courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions, including
admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure
in proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court
of the United States and for the judicial review or enforcement of orders of admin-
istrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the
Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than
the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been
thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary not-
withstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore
prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Similar authority with respect to criminal cases is granted in 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970).
28. 312U.S. at 10.
29. Id.
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II. RULES OF EVIDENCE-PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OR SUBSTANTIVE LAW?
In debating the Court's adoption of rules of evidence, Congress has
erroneously asserted that the Court possesses no power under the ena-
bling acts to prescribe rules of evidence.30 The same issue was
raised in regard to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3' which do
contain a number of provisions which affect the admissibility of evi-
dence. 32 The fact that Congress allowed such rules to go into effect
demonstrates its recognition that some areas of evidence are proce-
dural in nature.33 The conclusion that rules of evidence are included
in the term "procedure" finds additional support in a number of court
opinions and scholarly articles.34
30. See Rules of Evidence Proposed by Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the
House Judiciary Committee, 42 U.S.L.W. (Special Supp. at 5) (July 17, 1973) (The Sub-
committee's note to R. 402 states: "Congress should do nothing which would indicate
acquiescence in the judgment that the Court has authority to promulgate Rules of Evi-
dence .... ); 119 CONG. REC. 40, H 1727 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973) (a comment to the
effect that the hearings had settled the question of the Court's authority to prescribe rules
of evidence).
31. A difference of opinion as to the extent to which the Civil Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), authorizes the court to make rules dealing with evidence arose
within the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure. Preliminary Draft of
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States and the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia xvii (1936); Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States 108 (1937).
32. The following Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are rules of evidence: 23(b)(2)
(nonadmissibility of information concerning an insurance agreement); 27(a)(4) (admis-
sibility of deposition to perpetuate testimony); 32 (use of depositions in court proceed-
ings generally); 33(b) (use of interrogatories at trial); 35(b)(2) (waiver of privilege re-
garding medical testimony related to mental or physical condition where party requests
report of court ordered examination); 43 (general admissibility of evidence); 44 (proof
of official record); 44.1 (determination of foreign law).
33. See Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 1960):
For the most part ... rules of evidence relate to what lawyers have long thought of
as procedure. This is attested by the presence of Rules 43 and 44 in the Federal
Rules. The Rules Enabling Act denied the power of the Supreme Court in such
Rules to affect substantive rights. That the Supreme Court, after having this
problem brought sharply to mind, thought it appropriate to include them is some
considered evidence that with respect to admissibility at least, the subject was pro-
cedural.
The court in Monarch held that a statement of an injured person was admissible under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 despite a state law which provided that" 'no written statement by an
injured person shall be admissible in evidence ... in any civil action relating to the sub-
ject matter thereof....' " 281 F.2d at 404.
34. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 221, 23 1-32 (1882); Kellman v. Stoltz, I
F.R.D. 726, 728 (N.D. Iowa 1941); Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Il. 591, 114 N.E. 2d 686,
689 (1953); Hunt v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 355 Il. 504, 189 N.E. 907, 911 (1934):
People v. Clark, 283 Il1. 221, 119 N.E. 329, 331 (1918); Degnan, The Feasibility of
Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341, 345 (1960); Green, To What Ex-
tent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26
A.B.A.J. 482, 484-85 (1940); Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal
1190
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The distinction between procedure and substance is a perplexing
one. In Sibbach, the court stated, "[t] he test must be whether a rule
really regulates procedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."'3 5 Rules of
evidence are intended as aids in the discovery of truth36 and are,
therefore, designed to regulate the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law. Thus, for example, an act
which would allow the admission in evidence of a handwriting com-
parison has been held to be a matter of procedure for the purpose of
deciding whether application of the act to crimes committed prior to
its passage constituted a violation of the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution.37
If rules of evidence are generally matters of procedure, it neverthe-
less can be argued that certain areas of evidence law (e.g., privileged
communications) are declarations of a general public policy and are
therefore substantive. Rather than facilitating the search for truth,
rules of privilege act to exclude evidence which could possibly aid in the
determination of the issues involved. Thus, privileges are not granted
because of a desire on the part of the court or the legislature to facili-
tate the enforcement of rights and duties, but in furtherance of an
underlying public policy unrelated to procedure.38 An example of
such a nonprocedural rule of evidence is the doctor-patient privilege
whereby a physician or surgeon may not, without the consent of his
patient, be examined as to any information acquired in attending such
patient.39 The doctor-patient privilege is not designed to facilitate the
efficient dispatch of the court's business; rather, it involves a determi-
nation by the legislature that in order to encourage complete patient
disclosure of personal information, aiding diagnosis and thus insuring
Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 433-35 (1958); Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or
Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467, 469, 483-84 (1957); Orfield, Can Rules of Evidence
Be Codified?, 42 N.D. L. REv. 13 (1965); A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and
Feasibility of Developing Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30
F.R.D. 73, 101-02 (1962).
35. 312U.S.atl4.
36. Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe
Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.AJ. 601, 603 (1940).
37. Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 385, 388 (1898).
38. Riedl, note 36 supra, at 603.
39. The doctor-patient privilege was omitted from the rules as proposed by the
Court. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241
(1973) (Advisory Committee's Note).
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proper medical care for everyone, communications between a doctor
and his patient must be protected. 40
III. THE RULES AS PRESCRIBED BY THE COURT 41
Except for Article III (Presumptions) and Article V (Privileges), the
rules of evidence proposed by the Court are procedural. 42 In fact, the
subject matter of several of the rules has been held expressly to be
procedural in nature. Under the Erie doctrine,43 a federal court whose
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, is required to apply the
law of the state in which it sits except as to matters of procedure. In
Pasternak v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,44 a diversity case, the
court impliedly recognized that the admissibility of evidence is a ques-
tion of procedure when it held that evidence of a felony conviction,
which conviction had occurred 5 years prior to the action in ques-
tion, was properly admitted despite a contrary state rule declaring
such evidence to be admissible only when offered within 5 years of
the prior conviction. Similarly, whether one is an adverse witness 45
and whether expert testimony should be admitted46 have been held to
40. Joiner and Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule
Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 623, 650-51 (1957).
41. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates. 56 F.R.D. 183
(1973).
42. Article I (General Provisions; e.g., Purpose and Construction and Rulings on
Evidence), Article II (Judicial Notice), Article IX (Authentication and Identification).
Article X (Contents of Writings, Recordings and Photographs) and Article XI (Miscella-
neous Rules; e.g., Applicability of the Rules) contain housekeeping rules designed to
facilitate the orderly dispatch ofjudicial business and raise no serious questions as to the
procedural-substantive dichotomy.
It may be, however, that Rule 105 (Summing Up and Comment by Judge) would be
considered substantive in Washington. This rule would permit a judge to comment on
the evidence, whereas WASH. CoNsT. art. IV, § 16, provides: "Judges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.-
Inherent in this constitutional provision is a strong concern over the potential impact
which a judge's comments on the evidence may have upon the jury's decision.
43. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
44. 417 F.2d 1292, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 1969). Impeachment. competency and other
rules concerning witnesses are contained in Article VI of the Rules, note 41 supra.
45. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Berry, 416 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1969): "[The] question
of whether one is an adverse witness is a question of procedure rather than substance
and thus is governed by federal and not state rules."
46. Haddigan v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844, 851 (3d Cir. 1971). In Haddigan, the court
held that in deciding whether expert testimony on the economic value of services ren-
dered by a wife and mother should be admissible in a wrongful death action, a federal
district court need not look to the law of the forum state but may look to federal author-
ities which favor admissibility. The federal rule with respect to hypothetical questions
has been held to apply in a diversity case despite a contrary state rule. Twin City Plaza.
Inc. v. Central Surety and Ins. Corp.. 409 F.2d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 1969). Haddigan
1192
Federal Rules of Evidence
be questions of procedure. Finally, in Dallas County v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co.,47 the court held that the question of the admis-
sibility of a newspaper article which the court had characterized as
hearsay is a question of procedure.
In contrast, rules of privilege (Article V) are substantive48 and
therefore outside the Court's power to prescribe rules of "practice and
procedure." In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Brei, the
court concluded:49
The patient-physician privilege is more than a rule of procedure since
it goes to relationships established and maintained outside the area of
litigation, and "affect [s] people's conduct at the stage of primary pri-
vate activity and should therefore be classified as substantive or
quasi-substantive."
Besides the "primary private activity" rationale, the result in Brei is
also supported by the fact that privileges are based on underlying
public policies which have nothing to do with the efficient conduct of
litigation. 50 In fact, by excluding relevant evidence, rules of privilege
tend to hinder the search for truth.51
Article III of the proposed rules (Presumptions) is also outside the
Court's authority to promulgate rules of "practice and procedure."
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap52 involved the question of whether a
and Twin City Plaza indicate that the subject matter of Article VII (Opinions and Ex-
pert Testimony) is procedural.
47. 286 F.2d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 1961). Dallas County constitutes authority for the
proposition that Article VIII (hearsay), involves questions of procedure rather
than substance.
48. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
49. 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1962) (footnotes omitted). In an action for declara-
tory judgment, the insurer sought to avoid liability under a policy on the ground that the
decedent-insured had committed suicide. The trial court excluded from evidence certain
testimony of the decedent's physician on the grounds that it was privileged information.
The trial court's action was upheld on appeal.
Other cases in which courts have concluded that privileges are substantive include:
Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555-56 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967)
(dictum re attorney-client privilege); Krizak v. W.C. Brooks & Sons, 320 F.2d 37,
42-43 (4th Cir. 1963) (Virginia statute providing that a report of an automobile acci-
dent may not be used in evidence in any trial arising out of the-accident); Baird v. Ko-
erner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960) (attorney-client); State Mutual Life Assurance
Co. v. Wittenberg, 239 F.2d 87, 91-92 (8th Cir. 1956) (doctor-patient); and Palmer v.
Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1955) (certified public accountant's privilege). Be-
cause federal jurisdiction in each of these cases was based upon diversity of citizenship,
the question was presented whether the privileges were procedural or substantive for the
purpose of applying the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
50. 311 F.2d at 466.
51. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
52. 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
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federal court must apply a state rule "prescribing how and by whom
the facts should be shown where one party to a contest concerning
ownership of land claims the legal title as bona fide purchaser. '53 The
trial court had held that the burden of proving bona fide purchaser
status was a question of procedure and refused to apply a state rule
which placed the burden on the party who challenged the legal title.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the issue was substantive: 54
We cannot accept the view that the question presented was only one of
practice in courts of equity. Rather we think it relates to a substantial
right upon which the holder of recorded legal title to Texas land may
confidently rely. Petitioner was entitled to the protection afforded by
the local rule. In the absence of evidence showing it was not a bona
fide purchaser its position was superior to a claimant asserting an eq-
uitable interest only. This was a valuable assurance in favor of its title.
The "reliance" theory in Dunlap is very similar to the "primary pri-
vate activity" language in Brei; the court in Brei could have con-
cluded just as easily that the doctor and patient had a substantial right
to rely on the state rule which protected their communications with
one another. Both opinions also stress an underlying public policy. In
Brei, the policy of encouraging free and open communications be-
tween a doctor and his patient was emphasized, and in Dunlap, the
policy of protecting one who has recorded his title to property was re-
lied upon. Finally, presumptions, like privileges, may tend, in certain
circumstances, to impede the search for truth. For example, a pre-
sumption may result in placing the burden of proof upon the litigant
who is not "in possession" of the relevant evidence.
In addition to privileges and presumptions, some of the rules in Ar-
53. Id. at 209.
54. Id. at 212. In Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959), a diversity
case involving a dispute over whether an insured died as a result of suicide or accident.
the Court stated:
In a case like this one, North Dakota presumes that death was accidental and places
on the insurer the burden of proving that death resulted from suicide .... Under the
Erie rule, presumptions (and their effects) and burden of proof are "substantive"
and hence respondent was required to shoulder the burden during the instant trial ....
Id. at 446 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence took the stance that application of
state law is not called for where the presumption to be applied is "tactical." Not only
did the Committee fail to define "tactical," it did not cite any authority for the proposi-
tion that the state law need not be applied in such a situation. 56 F.R.D. 183, 211
(1973).
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ticle IV (Relevancy and Its Limits) are arguably substantive. Gener-
ally this is not true, since the exclusion of irrelevant evidence is di-
rectly related to the desire to enhance the efficiency with which a trial
court hears and decides a case. That the rules of relevancy, as pre-
scribed by the Court, were designed to facilitate the orderly dispatch
of judicial business is illustrated by Rule 403:55
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
However, of the rules in Article IV, Rules 407 (Subsequent Reme-
dial Measures), 408 (Compromise and Offers to Compromise), 409
(Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses), 410 (Offer to Plead
Guilty; Nolo Contendere; Withdrawn Plea of Guilty) and 411 (Lia-
bility Insurance) are arguably substantive. The exclusion of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures, offers to compromise, payment of
the plaintiff's medical expenses, plea bargaining and the defendant's
liability insurance can be based upon the irrelevance of such evidence
to the question of liability or guilt. However, as the Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules of Evidence recognized, each of these rules is founded
on a second "policy" reason. The exclusion of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures encourages people to take-or at least does not dis-
courage people from taking-steps in furtherance of added safety. 56
The exclusion of evidence of compromise and offers to compromise
rests upon "the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement
of disputes."57 " [E] vidence of payment of medical, hospital, or sim-
ilar expenses of an injured party by the opposing party, is not admissi-
ble, the reason often given being that such payment or offer is usually
made from humane impulses and not from an admission of liability,
and that to hold otherwise would tend to discourage assistance to the
injured person. '58 "Exclusion of offers to plead guilty or nolo has as
its purpose the promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compro-
55. 56 F.R.D. at 218-19 (1973).
56. Id. at 225-26 (Advisory Committee's Note).
57. Id. at 227 (Advisory Committee's Note).
58. Id. at 228 (Advisory Committee's Note).
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mise." 59 Finally, the exclusion of evidence of insurance coverage is
based on a concern that knowledge of such coverage might induce
juries to decide cases on improper grounds.60
Despite these considerations, Rules 407 through 411 should be
viewed as rules of practice and procedure. Even in the absence of the
above mentioned "policy" considerations, the evidence excluded
under these rules would still be inadmissible on the basis of irrele-
vancy to the question of liability or guilt. In fact, the policy reasons
upon which the rules are based (e.g., encouragement of compromise)
are directly related to the adequate, simple, prompt and inexpensive
administration of justice. Finally, unlike the protection of privileged
communications which is aimed at primary private activity unrelated
to a pending suit, the exclusion of evidence under these rules is aimed
at activity connected with anticipated litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the exception of privileges and presumptions, rules of evi-
dence are procedural, and their promulgation is, therefore within the
authority of the United States Supreme Court under the enabling acts.
Congressional preemption of the Rules of Evidence, rather than
based upon any sound conclusions in regard to the Court's power to
prescribe such rules, may have been the result of the furor raised
during the hearings over Article V (Privileges). The rules as prescribed
by the Court do not recognize a general physician-patient privilege
nor do they recognize a journalist's privilege. Naturally, the failure of
the rules to recognize these privileges caused a good deal of concern
within the medical and journalistic professions. Besieged by memo-
randa from representatives of these interest groups, Congress over-
reacted by making broad generalizations in regard to the Court's
power.61
59. Id. at 229 (Advisory Committee's Note). In Rain v. Pavkov. 357 F.2d 506, 509
(3d Cir. 1966), the admissibility in evidence of a guilty plea to a charge of reckless
driving was held to be a matter of procedure:
It is the general rule that a plea of guilty to a charge of reckless driving is an admis-
sion against interest, and evidence thereof is admissible in an action for personal
injuries based upon the same facts and circumstances from which the charge arose.
. . . While the statutory rule of Pennsylvania [the forum state], upon which the
court below relied, is clearly to the contrary, it is not controlling in an action in the
federal courts.
60. 56 F.R.D. at 230 (Advisory Committee's Note).
61. See Hearings, note 7 supra, at 192-94, 342-52, 449-81, 583, 584, 586-89.
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Still, whatever its motivation, Congress has done nothing which it
lacked the power to do.6 2 However, with the exception of its treatment
of privileges and presumptions, the same is true of the Court. It is
suggested that rather than preempting the rules in their entirety, Con-
gress could have either deleted those sections which it deemed to be
substantive and allowed the remainder of the rules to go into effect, or
returned the rules to the Court with the suggestion that they be
amended in light of the information gathered at the hearings. Such a
course of action would have preserved the integrity of the Court in the
area of promulgation of rules while restricting the power of the Court
to the boundaries established by the enabling acts (i.e., practice and
procedure).
If and when Congress produces a code of evidence, it is anticipated
that many states will adopt the federal code for the sake of uniformity
between the state and federal courts. Thus the states which choose to
adopt such rules will have to face the question of which governmental
body possesses the power to promulgate rules of evidence. Congres-
sional preemption of the Federal Rules of Evidence should not be
taken as the last word on the question of which branch is properly in
the business of prescribing rules of evidence; rather, each state should
analyze the powers which are vested in its courts and the powers
which are vested in its legislature vis-h-vis each area of evidence law
which is to be affected.6 3
Lyle K. Wilson
62. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
63. The pertinent Washington provision is WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.190 (1963)
(emphasis added):
The supreme court shall have the power to prescribe, from time to time, the forms
of writs and all other process, the mode and manner of framing and filing proceed-
ings and pleadings; of giving notice and serving writs and process of all kinds; of
taking and obtaining evidence; of drawing up, entering and enrolling orders and
judgments; and generally to regulate and prescribe by rule the forms for and the
kind and character of the entire pleading, practice, and procedure to be used in all
suits, actions, appeals and proceedings of whatever nature by the supreme court,
superior courts and justices of the peace of the state. In prescribing such rules the
supreme court shall have regard to the simplification of the system of pleading,
practice and procedure in said courts to promote the speedy determination of liti-
gation on the merits.
It is unclear whether the phrase "of taking and obtaining evidence" refers to depositions
only or whether it refers to the entire area of evidence law.
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